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“EYE SEE YOU”: HOW CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS HAVE UTILIZED THE NERD
DEFENSE TO INFLUENCE JURORS’
PERCEPTIONS
Sarah Merry*
For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—
deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—
persistent, persuasive and unrealistic. Too often we hold
fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all facts
to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the
comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.1
Eyeglasses are “one of the most important artifacts used in
the courtroom.”2 In 2012, a defendant’s use of eyeglasses at trial
went to appeal in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Harris v. United States.3 “[A]t the heart of” the appeal was
whether the defendant’s rights were prejudiced by the Superior
Court’s issuing a change-of-appearance instruction,4 prompted by
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.S., Santa Clara University,
2009. I would like to thank my parents for their continued support and
encouragement. I would also like to offer a special thanks to Professor
Kathleen Darvil for her thoughtful suggestions and research advice, and to
the staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their careful edits and
insightful comments.
1
President John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address 2
(June 11, 1962) (transcript available in the National Archives), available at
http://research.archives.gov/description/193922.
2
LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORETTA A. MALANDRO, COURTROOM
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES § 1.21, at 42 (1985).
3
See Harris v. United States, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–6 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/moj-08-cf-1405.pdf.
4
A change-of-appearance instruction is given to a jury in circumstances
in which a defendant has changed his or her appearance after the commission
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the defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses at trial.5 This was
the first time that the appeals court considered a defendant’s
instructional challenge to a change-of-appearance instruction
issued solely because the defendant donned unnecessary eyewear
6
at trial. The court of appeals upheld the change-of-appearance
instruction and determined that the evidence supported the
instruction because the defendant had, among other things,
donned unnecessary eyeglasses.7 Importantly, the defendant’s
of a crime and such alteration in appearance may be considered by the jury as
“an indication of the defendant’s awareness of guilt and fear of
identification.” See comments to BARBARA BERGMAN, CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.303(B) (5th ed. 2008).
The change-of-appearance instruction issued in Harris states:
You heard evidence that Donnell Harris attempted to change his
appearance to avoid being identified. It is up to you to decide that he
took these actions. If you find he did so, you may consider this
evidence as tending to show his feelings of guilt which you may in
turn consider as tending to show actual guilt. On the other hand, you
may also consider that he may have taken these actions for reasons
fully consistent with innocence in this case. If you find that Donnell
Harris attempted to change his appearance to avoid being identified,
you should consider such evidence along with all the other evidence
in this case and give it as much weight as you think it deserves.
Trial Transcript at 87–88, United States v. Harris, No. CF1-18801-07 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 2008), reprinted in Appellant’s Limited Appendix, Harris, No.
08-CF-1405.
5
Zoe Tillman, Glasses an Issue in Appeal over Public Defender Intern’s
Slaying, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012, 1:32 PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/09/glasses-an-issue-in-appeal-overpublic-defender-interns-slaying.html%20/ (highlighting Donnell Harris’ use of
eyeglasses at trial, “a seemingly innocuous detail [that was] a key issue at the
heart of Harris’ appeal”).
6
Compare Brief for Appellee at 32, Harris, No. 08-CF-1405 (noting
that the D.C. Court of Appeals has never directly considered a defendant’s
challenge to a change-of-appearance instruction prompted solely by a
defendant’s use of eyewear at trial), with United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d
1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a defendant’s instructional challenge
to a change-of-appearance instruction because the lower court considered a
combination of the defendant’s beard, weight, and eyeglasses to equate to
“profound alterations” in appearance and therefore justifying the resulting
jury instruction).
7
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 (quoting the trial court, which informed
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identity was a key issue in the case.8 However, the court of
appeals left open a critical question: can a court issue a changeof-appearance instruction if a defendant wears nonprescriptive
eyeglasses to trial when the defendant’s identity is not
specifically at issue? This tactic is known as the “nerd
defense”—a persistent and unrealistic change in one’s
appearance aimed at persuading a jury of the defendant’s low
9
propensity to commit a crime. The court in Harris highlighted
the importance of the “glasses issue” by observing that an
increasing number of defendants have appeared at trial wearing
nonprescriptive eyeglasses.10
Evidence concerning a defendant’s appearance is rarely
admitted because it is often considered more prejudicial to the
defendant than it is probative.11 However, it is well documented
the jury that “there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Harris needs glasses
to read or anything else” and found that Harris’ explanation for the use of
eyeglasses was mere “speculation”); see also Brief for Appellee, supra note
6, at 30 n.32.
8
While one witness heard “‘two muffled gunshots’ and ‘could see the
gun being held and . . . most of the [shooter’s] arm,’” the witness did not
see the shooter’s face. Another witness also heard the gunshots but did not
see the shooter. Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 2.
9
Keith L. Alexander, Trendy, Non-Prescription Eyewear Latest in
Criminal Defendant Strategic Attire, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/trendy-non-prescription-eyewearlatest-in-criminal-defendant-strategic-attire/2012/03/17/gIQA62xJeS_story.html
(quoting New York defense lawyer Harvey Slovis, who encourages “all his
clients [to] wear glasses” to make them “appear less intimidating”); see also
Michael J. Brown, Is Justice Blind or Just Visually Impaired? The Effects of
Eyeglasses on Mock Juror Decisions, JURY EXPERT, Mar. 2011, at 1, 3,
available
at
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
TJEVol23Num2_Mar2011.pdf (finding that defendants who wear eyeglasses
appear to be more intelligent and less physically threatening).
10
Tillman, supra note 5 (noting that Chief Judge Eric Washington found
the eyeglasses issue particularly “compelling” because “a growing number of
defendants had been showing up for trial wearing glasses”).
11
See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s notes (“Character
evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on
the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good
man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite
what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.” (quoting CAL. LAW
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that juries do consider a defendant’s appearance at trial.12 Lisa
Wayne, President of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, stated, “the bottom line is we know people
judge a book by its cover,” a fact that implicates “the
13
fundamental fairness process.” A defendant who intends to
mislead the jury with respect to his or her altered appearance—
for instance, by wearing nonprescriptive eyeglasses to trial—
circumvents character evidence rules14 by unofficially
introducing into evidence positive character traits associated with
eyeglasses (e.g., intelligence, honesty, decreased propensity to
commit a violent crime).15 Unless a defendant’s identification is
REVISION COMM’N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING
TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (ART. VI. EXTRINSIC POLICIES
AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY) 615 (1964))).
12
See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in
the Litigation Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
15, 48 n.137 (1990) (“[P]hysical appearance of the litigant . . . can influence
the verdict.”). See generally Brown, supra note 9 (discussing a study linking
juror perceptions of defendant appearance with the likelihood of guilty or notguilty verdicts); Annie Murphy Paul, Judging by Appearance, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Nov. 1, 1997), http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200909/
judging-appearance (commenting that the influence of a defendant’s
appearance inside the courtroom is so great that an “entire industry has
emerged to advise lawyers, plaintiffs, and defendants on their aesthetic
choices”).
13
Jenny Montgomery, Dressing Defendants, IND. LAW. (May 23, 2012),
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/article/print?articleId=28848 (quoting Lisa
Wayne).
14
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (stating that “[e]vidence of a person’s
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait”). A
defendant’s appearance serves as a “substitute for any real discussion of
character during a trial.” Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming
Good Character Evidence to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT.
L. REV. 227, 231 n.10 (2004).
15
See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.21, at 42 (suggesting that
defendants should wear eyeglasses with wider lenses because people with a
“wide-eyed look or open-eyed look are considered to be more trustworthy,
more likable, and oftentimes more innocent”); Brown, supra note 9, at 3
(discussing a study finding that defendants who wear eyeglasses appear more
intelligent and less physically threatening); see also CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:23 (3d ed.
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relevant at trial, wearing unnecessary eyeglasses to artificially
alter appearance will not officially put a defendant’s appearance
at issue.16 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, when a
defendant’s identification is not specifically at issue, the
prosecution is unable to counter this unofficial introduction of
character evidence.17 Allowing a defendant to purposefully
falsify a vision defect by wearing nonprescriptive eyeglasses is
akin to allowing a defendant to appear in a wheelchair before the
jury when he or she is perfectly mobile.18 Both actions fabricate
2009) (stating that “[c]haracter embraces qualities like honesty or dishonesty,
[and] being peaceful or prone to violence”).
16
Generally, only when a defendant’s identification is a relevant trial
issue may a prosecutor comment on the defendant’s change in appearance
from the time that the crime was committed to the time that the defendant
appears at trial. GARY MULDOON, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW
YORK § 9:262 (2012–2013); see also People v. Sanders, 622 N.Y.S.2d 986,
987 (App. Div. 1995) (reasoning that the prosecutor’s comment on the
defendant’s change in hairstyle was not prejudicial, in part, because the
defendant’s identification was a factor in the trial).
17
A defendant must first introduce evidence of his or her pertinent
character traits at trial, and only when such evidence is officially admitted
may the prosecution offer evidence to rebut it. See FED. R. EVID.
404(a)(2)(A); see also FED. R. EVID. 405 (stating that proof of “character” at
trial through instances of specific conduct is limited to situations in which “a
person's character or character trait is an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense” or is otherwise admissible). However, when a defendant’s
identity is contentious at trial, eyeglasses may serve as a disguise, thereby
hindering identification and thus making a defendant’s use of eyeglasses
admissible as evidence relevant to the case. See Steve D. Charman & Gary
L. Wells, Eyewitness Lineups: Is the Appearance-Change Instruction a Good
Idea?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 5 (2007), available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/wells_articles_pdf/charman&wel
ls_appearance_change.pdf (noting that disguises typically involve the addition
of items such as hats, eyeglasses, or masks, and observing the “strong
debilitating effect of disguise on accurate recognition rates”); District of
Columbia v. Carter, No. 2010 CF1 005677 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012) (offering
an example of a prosecutor questioning a defendant’s sudden use of
eyeglasses at trial when the defendant’s identification is at issue).
18
See Jack Marshall, The Perplexing “Nerd Defense,” ETHICS ALARMS
(Feb. 21, 2011, 8:18 AM), http://ethicsalarms.com/2011/02/21/theperplexing-nerd-defense/#more-4880 (“Glasses convey information about
physical capabilities the same way coming into court on crutches or in a
wheelchair does.”).
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a physical disability in order to mislead the jury. Wearing
nonprescriptive eyeglasses can be deceptive because jurors might
not be able to discern whether a defendant truly requires
eyeglasses,19 and a defendant’s unnecessary use of eyeglasses
may subtly persuade the jury by playing upon one of society’s
most deeply rooted stereotypes: that wearing eyeglasses equates
to higher intelligence.20 Additionally, the jury may never even
21
consider the motive behind the defendant’s use of such a prop.
Such intentional misdirection undermines the truth-seeking
principles of the judicial system.22
Part I of this Note focuses on how the wearing of eyeglasses
significantly affects the way an individual is perceived and
briefly examines the influence of popular culture on the deeply
ingrained stereotype that wearing eyeglasses correlates to
increased intelligence. Part II analyzes the unofficial role of a
defendant’s appearance in the courtroom and discusses cases that
highlight the impact of a defendant’s appearance on criminal
19

See generally Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing a controlled study
of jurors’ perceptions of eyeglasses); Alexander, supra note 9 (finding that
eyeglasses often “escape notice”).
20
See Åke Hellström & Joseph Tekle, Person Perception Through Facial
Photographs: Effects of Glasses, Hair, and Beard on Judgments of
Occupation and Personal Qualities, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 693, 695
(articulating that judgments about intelligence and success can be traced back
to the development of myopia caused by extensive schoolwork in childhood
days); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (finding that eyeglasses have a
positive correlation to increased intelligence in juror perceptions of
defendants); Francine C. Jellesma, Do Glasses Change Children’s
Perceptions? Effects of Eyeglasses on Peer- and Self-Perception, EUR. J.
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (2012) (arguing that “the association
between eyeglasses and intelligence is part of the nerd stereotype” because
“almost 50% of the people think eyeglasses are part of the physical
appearance of nerds”).
21
Wolfgang Manz & Helmut E. Lueck, Influence of Wearing Glasses on
Personality Ratings: Crosscultural Validation of an Old Experiment, 27
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 704, 704 (1968) (describing the wearing of
eyeglasses as “an irrelevant cue,” which may lead jurors to be unconsciously
persuaded by a defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses).
22
See Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 95, 99 (1996) (“None of the trial’s functions are more central to its
legitimacy than the search for truth.”).
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trials despite the inadmissibility of such character evidence. Part
III introduces the so-called “nerd defense” and examines the
effect of a defendant’s use of eyeglasses on juror perceptions.
This section further explores the use of the nerd defense by
criminal defendants to purposefully mislead jurors. Part IV
examines the intersection of the nerd defense and change-ofappearance instructions. Additionally, this section criticizes the
Harris opinion for failing to address the use of eyeglasses for
the purpose of jury persuasion. Part V of this Note
acknowledges the need to balance a defendant’s right of free
expression against the potential for jury manipulation and
proposes two solutions: (1) imposing a modified change-ofappearance instruction that removes language relating to
consciousness of guilt and (2) allowing for an eyeglasses inquiry
when a defendant suddenly dons eyeglasses at trial.
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND EYEGLASSES
The National Eye Institute reports that, as of 2008, more
than 150 million Americans used corrective eyewear.23
Eyeglasses are specifically designed to correct “congenital or
acquired vision deficits such as myopia, presbyopia, or
astigmatism.”24 However, it is clear that wearing eyeglasses is
25
no longer only for those with vision deficiencies. As of 2011,
the Vision Council estimates that approximately sixteen million
Americans wear nonprescriptive eyeglasses for the purpose of
changing their appearances.26
23

PREVENT BLINDNESS AM. & NAT’L EYE INST., VISION PROBLEMS IN
U.S. 12 (2008), available at http://www.preventblindness.net/site/
DocServer/VPUS_2008_update.pdf.
24
Helmut Leder et al., The Glasses Stereotype Revisited: Effects of
Eyeglasses on Perception, Recognition, and Impression of Faces, 70 SWISS J.
PSYCHOL. 211, 211 (2011).
25
See id. (describing how eyeglasses not only serve to correct eyesight
but also function as facial accessories that are linked to fashion demands); see
also ESSILOR OF AM. & LUXOTTICA GRP., 20/20 OPTICIANS’ 2008 HANDBOOK
4–5 (4th ed. 2008) (observing that eyeglasses can be useful for those who
wish to project their individualism or who simply desire to appear
fashionable).
26
Michelle Healy, Prescription Eyeglass Frames Get Softer Look, USA

THE

732

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. The Impact of the Eye Region on Perception of the Face

Humans, from their earliest stages of life, are drawn to the
eye region.27 In fact, infants recognize eyes before they are able
28
to recognize faces. The eyes play a critical role in developing
perceptions of the face.29 The eye region is also fundamental to
nonverbal communication because emotions, attention, and
30
intentions are all perceived through observing one’s eye gaze.
For example, wide-open eyes signal the emotions of surprise and
fear.31 A study designed specifically to measure the relative time
a subject looks at the eye region during a “social impressionformation task” revealed that eyes are the facial feature that
people spend the most time analyzing.32 When presented with
static facial displays,33 subjects spent 43.4% of their visual
inspection time on the eye region and only 12.6% of their visual
inspection time on the mouth region.34 The social impressionformation task is pertinent in a courtroom setting because a

TODAY (Sept. 15, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/LIFE/usaedition/
2011-09-15-eyeglass-frames_ST_U.htm.
27
Jellesma, supra note 20, at 2.
28
M.J. Taylor et al., Eyes First! Eye Processing Develops Before Face
Processing in Children, 12 NEUROREPORT 1671, 1676 (2001).
29
Dan Nemrodov and Roxane J. Itier, The Role of Eyes in Early Face
Processing: A Rapid Adaptation Study of the Inversion Effect, 102 BRIT. J.
PSYCHOL. 783, 793 (2011).
30
R.J. Itier & M. Batty, Neural Bases of Eye and Gaze Processing: The
Core of Social Cognition, 33 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 843,
844 (2009) (noting that “the human brain has developed a very complex
cognitive system of gaze direction analysis based on perceptual elements of
faces and eyes”).
31
Id. at 845.
32
Stephen W. Janik et al., Eyes as the Center of Focus in the Visual
Examination of Human Faces, 47 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 857, 857–58
(1978); see also Leder et al., supra note 24, at 211 (noting that eyes are
located in a “prominent position in the visual field”).
33
Static facial displays depict no movement in the facial region of the
person shown in the slide. Janik et al., supra note 32, at 858.
34
Subjects spent a greater portion of their looking time on the eye region
as compared to the hair, nose, ear, or mouth regions, regardless of the facial
expression or sex of the person depicted in the slide. Id.
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defendant’s facial features will be seemingly static to the jury.35
Generally, if a defendant does not take the stand to speak in his
or her own defense,36 there will not be occasion for prolonged
interaction between a defendant’s eyes and mouth that may
affect the viewer’s primary focus on the defendant’s eye
region.37 Because eyeglasses significantly alter the appearance of
the eye region, wearing eyeglasses impacts the type of social
38
information that is perceived through facial processing.
B. Studies Concerning the Effect of Eyeglasses on Judgment
and Perception
Social information about others is gleaned through facial
processing, and “even the briefest of glances at a face is
sufficient to furnish a wealth of knowledge about its owner.”39
To form judgments and perceptions of others, people rely
heavily on their cognitive representations (schemata).40
Collectively shared schemata can be described as widely held

35

Compare id. at 857–58 (discussing a study conducted by presenting the
subjects with various slides depicting static faces), with SMITH & MALANDRO,
supra note 2, § 1.12, at 22 (noting that “[m]ost of the time jurors are
watching what is referred to as ‘static’ facial behavior in the courtroom”).
36
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329–30 (1991) (describing a
sample study of Philadelphia felony defendants that revealed that only half of
criminal defendants took the stand); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and
Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death
Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1998) (finding that “most
defendants [in California capital jury trials] did not testify”). But see HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146–48 (1966) (finding
that the percentage of defendants who testify depends on the defendants’ prior
records and the amount of evidence against the defendants).
37
See Janik et al., supra note 32, at 858 (concluding that the study does
not determine the extent to which a subject’s primary focus would change due
to a person’s eye and mouth movements during prolonged inspection by the
subject).
38
Jellesma, supra note 20, at 2.
39
K.A. Quinn & C.N. Macrae, Categorizing Others: The Dynamics of
Person Construal, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 467, 476 (2005).
40
Id. at 467.
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social stereotypes.41 Character traits are associated with
schemata, and, when one schema is activated, “the associated
traits are attributed to the target person in the form of a first
impression.”42 Eyeglasses greatly impact both the perception and
recognition of others because they frame the eyes and make
more distinct the facial region found to receive the most notable
fixation.43
Numerous studies demonstrate that a perceived correlation
between wearing eyeglasses and heightened intelligence develops
in early childhood and continues to strengthen with age. This
perception also exists among children who wear eyeglasses
themselves, suggesting that some children, through their own
experiences, might learn to associate myopia with intelligence.44
Sarah Sandow, Reader in Education at the West London
Institute, conducted a study revealing that children as young as
eight years old draw a connection between wearing eyeglasses
and possessing intelligence.45 Children ages eight to ten
consistently drew a “very clever” person with eyeglasses but did
not do the same for stupid or nasty people.46 Hannu Räty and
Leila Snellman, professors at the University of Joensuu in
Finland, led a similar study that asked children to draw an
“intelligent” person and found that children consistently drew
eyeglasses in their images.47 However, when asked to draw an
41

Roger L. Terry & John H. Krantz, Dimensions of Trait Attributions
Associated with Eyeglasses, Men’s Facial Hair, and Women’s Hair Length,
23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1757, 1757 (1993).
42
Id.
43
Leder et al., supra note 24, at 221.
44
Jeffrey J. Walline et al., What Do Kids Think About Kids in
Eyeglasses?, 28 OPHTHALMIC & PHYSIOLOGICAL OPTICS 218, 223 (2008)
(noting that another origin of children’s development of the stereotype that
wearing eyeglasses equates to higher intelligence could be the media’s
depictions of “intelligent-nerds”).
45
See Sarah Sandow, The Good King Dagobert, or Clever, Stupid, Nice,
Nasty, 12 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 83, 86–91 (1997) (commenting that “[i]t was
fascinating that the wearing of glasses has survived as a stereotype for
cleverness” and that “spectacles lend an air of dignity and bookishness, and
the wearers are cool and confident”).
46
Id. at 91–92.
47
Hannu Räty & Leila Snellman, Children’s Images of an Intelligent
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“ordinary” person, children rarely sketched a person with
eyeglasses.48 David Chambers, Director of the Sciences in
Society Centre at Deakin University, developed the well-known
Draw-a-Scientist-Test (“DAST”), designed to determine when
children develop stereotypical images of a scientist (“a man of
knowledge”).49 Chambers’ test was administered over an elevenyear period to nearly 5,000 children and found that the
association between scientists and eyeglasses continues to
increase with age.50 When Mark Thomas, a doctoral student in
the Department of Psychology at Mississippi State University,
administered a modified DAST to college-aged students (with a
mean age of roughly twenty-one years), it revealed that the
stereotype of eyeglasses correlating to higher intelligence does
not fade with age: the drawings depicted a scientist with
51
eyeglasses nearly seventy percent of the time.
Person, 12 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 773, 778 (1997) (noting that
older children depicted eyeglasses more frequently than younger children and
that “eyeglasses are an almost archetypal sign of a ‘bookworm,’ a person
absorbed in mental activity”); see also Hannu Räty & Leila Snellman, On the
Social Fabric of Intelligence, 4 PAPERS ON SOC. REPRESENTATIONS 1, 2–3
(1995) (concluding that “children have captured some central value-bound
ideas of intelligence prevalent in our culture well before being capable of
understanding them conceptually”).
48
Räty & Snellman, Children’s Images of an Intelligent Person, supra
note 47, at 778.
49
David Wade Chambers, Stereotypic Images of the Scientist: The Drawa-Scientist Test, 67 SCI. EDUC. 255, 256–58 (1983) (noting that eyeglasses
are associated with eyestrain and therefore are associated with acute
observation). In Chambers’ study, each drawing was analyzed for seven
predetermined indicators of a scientist: lab coat, eyeglasses, growth of facial
hair, symbols of research, symbols of knowledge, technology (products of
science), and relevant captions. Id.; see also Räty & Snellman, Children’s
Images of an Intelligent Person, supra note 47, at 781 (noting significant
overlap between the results of the Children’s Images of an Intelligent Person
study and Chambers’ DAST results of children’s portrayals of the scientist as
“a man of knowledge”).
50
Chambers, supra note 49, at 257–58 (reporting that the number of
indicators in children’s standard images of a scientist increased from fourteen
in kindergarten-age children to 1,524 in fifth-grade-aged children).
51
Mark D. Thomas et al., The Draw a Scientist Test: A Different
Population and a Somewhat Different Story, 40 C. STUDENT J. 140, 144
(2006).
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The following studies indicate that perceptions and judgments
of those who wear eyeglasses permeate cultural, gendered, and
racial divides. As far back as 1944, G.R. Thornton, a professor
in the Department of Psychology at Purdue University, found
that people who wear eyeglasses are judged as being more
intelligent, more industrious, more honest, and more dependable
than those who do not wear eyeglasses.52 A subsequent crosscultural study conducted twenty-five years later paralleled
Thornton’s findings.53 A study led by Åke Hellström, professor
in the Department of Psychology at Stockholm University,
conducted a facial attributes rating analysis that directly linked
the wearing of eyeglasses with professionalism and intellect.54
Specifically, this study revealed a strong perceived correlation
between the wearing of eyeglasses and both prestigious
55
occupations and positive character traits. In 1991, a genderbased study on stereotypes associated with eyeglasses found that
both men and women who wear eyeglasses are perceived as
52

G.R. Thornton, The Effect of Wearing Glasses upon Judgments of
Personality Traits of Persons Seen Briefly, 28 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 203, 203
(1944). Subjects wearing eyeglasses and judged via photographic slides were
rated as more intelligent, more industrious, more honest, and more
dependable. Id. However, subjects wearing eyeglasses and judged in person
were rated as more intelligent and more industrious, but not necessarily as
more honest. Id. at 207. When judged only by photographs, the subjects’
dress, demeanor, and overall appearance were excluded, supporting the
proposition that a person’s demeanor is also taken into account when
personality traits are judged. Id.; see also G.R. Thornton, The Effect upon
Judgments of Personality Traits of Varying a Single Factor in a Photograph,
18 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 127 (1943).
53
Manz & Lueck, supra note 21, at 704 (replicating Thornton’s study
with German students 25 years later, with subjects in photographs wearing
eyeglasses producing higher ratings than subjects not wearing eyeglasses in
the categories of intelligence, industriousness, dependability, and honesty).
54
Hellström & Tekle, supra note 20, at 694.
55
Hellström and Tekle’s study found that wearing eyeglasses positively
correlates to the occupations of physician, lawyer, professor, engineer,
pastor, politician, psychologist, and bank clerk, and positively correlates to
judged character attributes of trustworthiness, helpfulness, and intelligence.
Id. at 699. However, the study found that wearing eyeglasses negatively
correlates to the occupations of factory worker, colonel, farmer, and
salesman, and to the character attributes of masculinity and being suspect. Id.

THE NERD DEFENSE

737

being more intelligent, well-educated, well-read, and better
employed.56 In 1993, a study examining the effects of eyeglasses
and gender on perceived social forcefulness and mental
competence confirmed that, overall, both men and women who
wear eyeglasses are judged as having decreased forcefulness and
heightened mental capacity.57 However, this study found that
eyeglasses tend to detract from social appeal more in women
58
than in men. In 2011, a study found that faces depicted with
eyeglasses were consistently judged to be significantly more
successful, more trustworthy, and more intelligent than faces
depicted without eyeglasses.59 Even details such as whether the
eyeglasses worn are rimless or full-rimmed can have an impact
on trustworthiness and facial recognition.60 An earlier study
using African-American and Caucasian subjects analyzed the
effects of wearing eyeglasses in a courtroom setting.61 Echoing
the results of previous studies, researchers found a strong link
between wearing eyeglasses and perceived intelligence and a
correlation between perceived intelligence of a defendant and
decreased likelihood of a juror to render a guilty verdict.62
The perceived correlation between wearing eyeglasses and
heightened intelligence may be the result of a “nerd stereotype”
that is deeply rooted in one’s schemata, in one’s social
56

See Mary B. Harris, Sex Differences in Stereotypes of Spectacles, 21 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1659, 1674–75 (1991).
57
Terry & Krantz, supra note 41, at 1757, 1765–66.
58
Id. at 1759.
59
Leder et al., supra note 24, at 218–19.
60
Id. at 216–19 (noting that “faces without eyeglasses [are] judged to be
less successful and less intelligent than faces with full-rim glasses or rimless
glasses,” and observing that it takes longer to recognize faces with full-rim
glasses than it does to recognize faces either without glasses or with rimless
glasses).
61
See Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (finding no significant difference in the
number of guilty verdicts rendered against African-American defendants
(forty-nine percent) and Caucasian defendants (fifty-one percent) and
concluding that, overall, participants rendered “guilty” verdicts forty-four
percent of the time against defendants who wore eyeglasses while rendering
“guilty” verdicts fifty-six percent of the time against defendants who did not
wear eyeglasses).
62
Id.
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experiences, and in the media’s portrayal of intelligent people.63
Stereotypes about people who wear eyeglasses abound in popular
culture—in Hollywood film characters,64 highly rated television
series,65 best-selling novels,66 classic comic books,67 and,
63

Jellesma, supra note 20, at 2–5.
In 1918, Harold Lloyd’s “Glasses Character” became the “persona for
which he would ultimately be celebrated.” Maurizio Giammarco, Harold
Lloyd: Horatio Alger in Straw Hat and Horn-Rims, in PLAYBILLS TO
PHOTOPLAYS: STAGE PERFORMERS WHO PIONEERED THE TALKIES 1, 143–47
(Brenda Loew ed., 2010). Lloyd’s eyeglasses marked him as “more gentle,
kind, and clever in nature.” Id.; see also Annette M. D’Agostino, Harold
Lloyd: The Glasses, SILENTS ARE GOLDEN (1998), http://www.silentsare
golden.com/hlloydglassesarticle.html (quoting Harold Lloyd) (“There is more
magic in a pair of horn-rimmed glasses than the opticians dream of, nor did I
guess the half of it when I put them on in 1917.”). Later, the screwball
comedy Bringing Up Baby portrayed David Huxley as a bespectacled
paleontologist marked by horn-rimmed eyeglasses that were intended to
function as the visual marker of his “nerd” persona. See Eddie Deezen, Why
Do Nerds So Often Wear Glasses?, NEATORAMA (Jan. 11, 2012, 5:03 AM),
http://www.neatorama.com/2012/01/11/why-do-nerds-so-often-wear-glasses/.
65
Steve Urkel, a character on the popular television show Family
Matters, was known for his nerd persona marked by thick-rimmed eyeglasses
and suspenders. See Hannah Jones, “Urkel” Is Now a Verb—and a HighSchool Fashion Don’t, TIME (Dec. 9, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/
12/09/urkel-is-now-a-verb-and-a-high-school-fashion-dont/#ixzz2KS3ABLYn.
For a suggestion of the influence of Urkel’s eyeglasses on both American
culture and the American legal system, see Bruce Carton, “Change of
Appearance” Instruction Upheld in Case of Defendant Wearing Eyeglasses to
Court, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://legalblog
watch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2012/10/change-of-appearanceinstruction-upheld-in-case-of-defendant-wearing-hipster-glasses.html (“So in
D.C. courts, at least, defendants wear their Urkel glasses at their own
peril.”).
66
In the popular Superman comic book, Clark Kent used eyeglasses to
disguise himself as an astute reporter. See LES DANIELS, SUPERMAN: THE
COMPLETE HISTORY (2004); see also Superman Sales Figures, COMICHRON
(Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.comichron.com/titlespotlights/superman.html
(documenting that, from 1960 to 1986, Superman sold an estimated 110–15
million copies).
67
The Harry Potter novels became a wildly successful global
phenomenon that influenced millions of people. See SUSAN GUNELIUS,
HARRY POTTER: THE STORY OF A GLOBAL BUSINESS PHENOMENON (2008);
Guy Dammann, Harry Potter Breaks 400m in Sales, GUARDIAN (June 18,
64
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recently, in the media’s coverage of professional athletes.68 The
aforementioned studies, coupled with popular culture’s portrayal
of intelligent people, demonstrate the significant impact of
wearing eyeglasses on the development of judgments and
perceptions of others.
II. THE UNOFFICIAL ROLE OF APPEARANCE IN THE COURTROOM
Physical appearance is intimately tied to stereotypes about a
person’s character traits,69 and the triggering of stereotypes
70
based on appearance does not fade in a courtroom setting.
2008,
7:30
AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/jun/18/
harrypotter.news (noting that Harry Potter book sales “have topped 400m
worldwide”). In the novels, Harry is marked by his thick-rimmed eyeglasses
and consistently outsmarts his nemeses. See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY
POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 20 (1998).
68
Harvard economist Roland Fryer suggests that professional athletes use
eyeglasses to convey a message: a positive, but false, message that eyeglasses
imbue the wearer with greater intelligence. See Stephen J. Dubner, Playing
the Nerd Card: A New Marketplace Podcast, FREAKONOMICS (May 31, 2012,
9:26 AM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/05/31/playing-the-nerd-carda-new-marketplace-podcast/. The “nerd” appearance is transforming the
images of National Basketball Association (NBA) players, with eyeglasses
intended to signify, “We’re much, much smarter than you think.” Sean
Gregory,
NBA
Nerd
Alert,
TIME
(May
14,
2012),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2113816-2,00.html; see
also Matt Ufford, NBA Finals Fashion: Shut Up, Everyone Looks Fine,
SBNATION (June 13, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/
nba/2012/6/13/3079618/nba-finals-fashion-fake-glasses
(quoting
Dwayne
Wade) (stating that NBA players wear eyeglasses because “[i]t’s cool to be
smart [and] educated”).
69
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, §1.48, at 86.
70
A study conducted on the interplay between a defendant’s appearance
and an evaluation of a defendant found that attractive females (long hair and
cosmetics as opposed to short hair and no cosmetics) were more often given
short-term imprisonment ratings rather than long-term imprisonment ratings.
Angela S. Ahola et al., Is Justice Really Blind? Effects of Crime
Descriptions, Defendant Gender and Appearance, and Legal Practitioner
Gender on Sentences and Defendant Evaluations in a Mock Trial, 17
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. AND LAW 304, 319–20 (2010). This study further
noted that faces often trigger stereotypes, such that “[a] baby-faced defendant
will be considered less likely to have committed an offence intentionally, and
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While inferences drawn about a defendant’s character based on
his or her appearance may not be entirely inaccurate,71 such
inferences are arbitrarily drawn and difficult to verify.72 Thus, a
jury is generally precluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence
73
from taking into consideration a defendant’s character.
However, the physical appearance of a defendant still plays a
substantive role at trial.74 In fact, a defendant’s physical
appearance is of such vital importance to a trial that an entire
industry has developed for the purpose of advising a defendant
on his or her aesthetic appearance at trial.75
A. Character Evidence—Evidence the Jury Can Consider
Versus Evidence the Jury Does Consider
The courtroom, comprised of individuals who fill specialized
and particular roles,76 provides a dynamic platform for
discovering the truth. The jury trial is a central component of
the American adversarial system, its purpose being to sort
more likely to have committed an offence by negligence than a defendant
with a mature face.” Id. at 312.
71
Robert Agnew, Appearance and Delinquency, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 421,
424, 429 (1984) (finding a positive correlation between delinquency rates and
unattractive appearance and noting that unattractive people—premised on the
appearance of physical traits, dress, and grooming—are perceived as having
significantly less favorable characteristics than attractive people).
72
See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s notes (cautioning against
the use of character evidence at trial because it raises questions of relevancy
and proof).
73
See id.
74
See David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance
Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 193, 209
(1995); M.G. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of
Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in
a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. RES. PERSONALITY, 45, 45 (1974) (finding that
physically attractive defendants were judged with less certainty of guilt and
received milder punishments than unattractive defendants).
75
See Paul, supra note 12 (observing that jury consultants, “often trained
in both psychology and law,” advise defendants on what to wear and how to
appear in the courtroom).
76
These individuals include the judge, defendant(s), legal counsel,
audience, and witness(es).
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through competing positions in order to arrive at the truth.77
However, jurors hinder the truth-seeking process when they
consider evidence that is deemed inadmissible due to its
prejudicial effects.78 Though not always irrelevant,79 character
evidence that is used to prove that a defendant acted, in a
specific instance, in conformity with a character trait is often so
weakly probative of guilt that the prejudice of admitting such
evidence is likely to substantially outweigh the evidence’s
probative value.80 Character evidence is traditionally forbidden
because evidence of a defendant’s particular character trait does
not necessarily correlate to a defendant having “acted in

77

Strier, supra note 22, at 100 (“Arguably, the most compelling claim
supporting the adversary system of trial court dispute resolution is that it is
the best judicial system for truth-finding.”); see also Barbara A. Babcock,
Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9 n.31 (1993)
(noting that the Supreme Court "has recognized that the purpose of a trial is
to sort truth from untruth").
78
See Michelle Pan, Strategy or Stratagem: The Use of Improper
Psychological Tactics by Trial Attorneys to Persuade Jurors, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 259, 262 (2005); see also Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character:
A New Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1928–29
(2012) (stating that “[l]egal historians have commonly understood courts to
have developed the law of evidence to prevent jurors' ‘cognitive and
decisional failings’ from impacting their solemn duty to find the truth,” but
also noting that despite such laws, jurors are often unable to properly
consider character evidence) (citing Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed
Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 199 (2006)).
79
A defendant’s appearance may become relevant evidence if it “forms
the basis for identification.” Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The
Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 577 n.19 (2008).
80
Aviva A. Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character
Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 669–70 (1998) (“Even
assuming that such [character] evidence is reliable, a proposition which is
itself open to doubt, character evidence can be invasive, unfair, and
prejudicial.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 614 (5th Cir. 1991)
(noting that an instruction to introduce character evidence should be refused
where character evidence is not “central or crucial”).
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conformity with that trait or characteristic.”81 Nevertheless, a
defendant’s physical appearance at trial, whether consciously or
unconsciously acknowledged, significantly influences perception
of the defendant’s character and can influence the outcome of a
82
case.
Behind the decision to refrain from giving jurors a proper
instruction about consideration of a defendant’s appearance at
trial lie two incorrect assumptions: (1) jurors are unbiased83 and
(2) jurors consider only relevant evidence at trial.84 However,
jurors tend to favor defendants whom they find more relatable,
85
regardless of the facts. If jurors do, in fact, follow a court’s
81

Orenstein, supra note 80, at 668.
See Steven Fein et al., Hype and Suspicion: The Effects of Pretrial
Publicity, Race, and Suspicion on Jurors’ Verdicts, 53 J. SOC. ISSUES 487,
488–89 (1997) (observing that one factor contributing to “prejudicial effects
of nonevidentiary information” is a juror’s inability to block out an image or
thought of the defendant); Ross, supra note 14, at 227, 232 (“[T]he perceived
character of an accused affects the outcome of jury trials . . .”); see also
Steven Shepard, Note, Should the Criminal Defendant Be Assigned a Seat in
Court?, 115 YALE L.J. 2203, 2208 (2006) (“A defendant’s appearance
matters to the jury and can affect the outcome of a trial.”).
83
See HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ
JUROR 101–02 (1995); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Tara
Trask, a jury consultant with seventeen years of experience in litigation
strategy, who observed that “jurors tend to assign credibility to those who fit
the stereotypes they have”).
84
THORNTON, supra note 83, at 101–02. Jurors operate as “detectives,
assimilating important visual information to add to evidence,” even when the
visual information is irrelevant to the facts of the case. SMITH & MALANDRO,
supra note 2, § 1.50, at 90.
85
E.H. SUTHERLAND & D.R. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY
442 (7th ed. 1966) (“The main work of a trial lawyer is to make a jury like
his client, or, at least, to feel sympathy for him; facts regarding the crime are
relatively unimportant.”); see also Douglas Keene, Tattoos: When Should You
Clean Up Your Witness?, KEENE TRIAL CONSULTING (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://keenetrial.com/blog/2010/12/06/tattoos-when-should-you-clean-up-yourwitness/ (“The goal of the attorney presenting a witness is to help the jury
see the witness as ‘kind of like me’ or ‘someone I can trust.’ Appearance is a
part of that. If someone looks scary or unfamiliar, they are judged as less
trustworthy and less believable. The goal is to help them be more ‘relatable,’
regardless of the facts.”); Melanie Tannenbaum, Casey’s Case: What
Psychology Says About Anthony’s Acquittal, PSYSOCIETY (July 10, 2011),
82
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cautionary instructions to consider only relevant evidence,86 then
87
88
89
why do courts, jury consultants, and defense teams go to
such lengths to alter a defendant’s appearance at trial? Such

http://psysociety.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/casey-anthony/ (“Overall, jurors
are more likely to be lenient towards defendants that are similar to them in
some meaningful way. For example, jurors are less likely to convict
defendants if they are of the same gender or race, or if they come from a
similar socioeconomic background.”); John Schwartz, Extreme Makeover:
Criminal
Court
Edition,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
5,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/us/06tattoo.html (“‘It’s easier to give
someone who looks like you a fair shake,’ said [defense attorney] Bjorn E.
Brunvand.”).
86
CTJNY § 3:2 (2012) (describing to the jury what kind of evidence
may be considered during deliberations by stating that “[e]vidence consists of
the sworn testimony elicited both on direct examination and crossexamination, and redirect and recross, if any, plus any concessions made
during the trial by counsel, and any exhibits received and marked in
evidence”); see also FED-JI § 12:03 (6th ed. 2013) (“The evidence in this
case consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses—regardless of who may
have called them—all exhibits received in evidence—regardless of who may
have produced them—all facts which may have been agreed to or stipulated
and all facts and events which may have been judicially noticed.”); PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Fifth Circuit, Criminal Cases, § 1.01, 3–4 (2012)
(explaining to the jury what is not evidence, which includes “[s]tatements,
arguments, and questions by lawyers . . . [o]bjections to questions . . .
[t]estimony that the court has excluded . . . [and] [a]nything [the jurors] may
have seen, heard, or read outside the courtroom . . . .”).
87
See, e.g., Neil Nagraj, Court Pays $150 a Day to Cover Neo-Nazi
John Ditullio’s Tattoos During Murder Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 7,
2009),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-12-07/news/17940784_1_neonazi-compound-tattoos-extreme-makeover (describing a Florida court’s order
that required the state to pay a cosmetologist $150 for each day of trial in an
effort to cover the defendant’s facial tattoos (barbwire and teardrops) and
neck tattoos (large swastikas and a vulgar phrase)).
88
Literature on trial practice devotes significant portions to how to alter
a defendant’s appearance in accordance with known juror perceptions and
stereotypes. See generally SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, §§ 1.01–2.08.
89
See, e.g., Ivy Bigbee, Fashioning a Defense: Casey Anthony’s
Evolving Style, CRIM. REP. DAILY (Apr. 29, 2011), http://web.
archive.org/web/20120520050256/http://blogs.discovery.com/criminal_report/
2011/04/fashioning-a-defense-casey-anthonys-evolving-style.html (noting that,
due to her defense team, “Anthony’s courtroom appearances at hearings
ironically have spoken volumes, without her uttering a single word”).
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measures are taken because it is ingrained in American society
to judge others based on physical appearance:
We live in a society where people are bombarded with so
much information each day that they have learned to use
shortcut techniques to make decisions. One of these
shortcut techniques is to judge people based on initial
perceptions of their appearance, background, and
behavior. Once we have made these initial decisions
about an individual, all further communication is filtered
though this arrived-at perception. If we decide a person
“looks like a law student,” then we will proceed to treat
that perception as if it were an actual fact. We will
respond to the individual as though he actually was in
law school; that is, we might assume that he is an
intellectually capable, academically motivated, and
career-oriented person. It makes little difference whether
the initial perception is correct. People treat the
perception as accurate and make decisions from this base
of information.90
Juries—composed of a cross-section of American society—
judge in this same way.91 Jurors tend to consider any artificial
altering of a defendant’s physical appearance, including:
eyeglasses,92 clothing style,93 clothing color,94 makeup,95
90

SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, §1.48, at 86.
Levenson, supra note 79, at 576–77.
92
See generally Brown, supra note 9, at 1 (finding that appliances that
“alter the appearance of eyes—namely eyeglasses—may influence our
perceptions of an individual who uses such devices”).
93
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.19, at 36–37 (“It is important
to coach your client and witnesses with regard to personal appearance factors.
Witnesses do not have a good understanding of how much their clothing can
affect the total impact in the courtroom.”). Although clothing alone may not
change perception, it takes only one juror to notice clothing details and to
share them with others in order to have an impact on the decision-making
process. Id. § 1.16, at 29.
94
An industry has emerged, called “color consulting,” in which
consultants advise defendants on what clothing and make-up to wear at trial.
Black colors should not be worn by defendants on trial for murder because
“the connotations associated with black tend to be consistent across cultures
and are deeply embedded in our minds.” Id. § 1.28, at 55. Red is associated
91
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jewelry,96 and hairstyle.97 Yet, unless given specific instruction,
jurors might not know how to properly consider those judgments
in relation to the facts of the case.98
B. The Impact of the Defendant’s Appearance on Juror
Perceptions
As the following cases highlight, a defendant’s appearance,
although generally inadmissible as evidence, can still impact
jurors’ perceptions at trial. In Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme
Court recognized the impact of a defendant’s appearance on
with “passion, violence, excitement, and blood,” and should not be worn by
defendants. Id.
95
W.J. McKeachie, Lipstick as a Determiner of First Impressions of
Personality: An Experiment for the General Psychology Course, 36 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 241, 242 (1952) (concluding from a study that women who wear
lipstick are judged as being more frivolous, more conscientious, and having
more overt interest in males).
96
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.23, at 44 (“Jewelry, to the
juror-detective, offers many stereotypes which will affect the total perception
of the individual.”). For a discussion of rings, see id. § 1.50, at 91
(explaining that a ring worn on the ring finger indicates a stable relationship).
For a discussion of defendants wearing watches to trial, see Martha Neil,
Defendant Puts Best Face Forward, After Extreme Makeover, in Capital
Murder Case, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 6, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/defendant_puts_best_face_forward_sans_most_tattoo
s_in_capital_murder_case/ (reporting that, in the Enron Trial, consultant
Douglas Keene told his clients “to be sure they didn’t wear their $10,000
watches to trial”).
97
See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.24, at 50 (“Hair that is
curly will make the person appear energetic. For the perception of credibility,
the hair should be short, tailored, and professional.”).
98
The jury may be instructed on how to specifically consider a
defendant’s appearance at trial when the defendant’s appearance is relevant,
such as when the defendant’s identification is at issue. See MULDOON, supra
note 16, § 9:262 (stating that “[w]ith the time lag between the occurrence of
the crime and the trial, the defendant’s appearance may change, whether with
time, fashions or because of an attempt at disguise for trial” and “[t]he
defendant’s appearance at the time of the crime is relevant for purposes of
identification”); see also Joseph v. State, 642 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (noting that the trial court had the authority to instruct jurors on
how to properly consider religious dress in the courtroom).
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juries.99 The Court found that forcing a defendant to wear prison
attire before a jury infringed upon his or her Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights.100 A defendant clothed in an
orange jumpsuit at trial can give the jury the impression that the
defendant is more likely to have committed the crime, something
the Court deemed inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence in the American justice system.101 Even though the
character evidence derived from the defendant’s appearance was
inadmissible, the Court recognized the likely prejudicial effect of
the defendant’s clothing on the jury.102 The Court concluded that
jurors, at least in some instances, are unable to ignore a
defendant’s appearance.103
In 2010, a Florida judge recognized the likelihood of a
defendant’s appearance impacting the jury.104 John Ditullio faced
the death penalty for charges related to the violent stabbing and
death of a teenager but ultimately received life in prison without
the possibility of parole.105 Ditullio’s defense team successfully
argued that his neo-Nazi tattoos—although acquired after his
arrest—would be too distracting and too prejudicial for the

99

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976) (“The defendant’s
clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that, not
unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also
witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play.”).
100
Id. at 512–13.
101
Id. at 503 (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in
the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of
criminal justice.”); see also THORNTON, supra note 83, at 111–12
(supporting the proposition that a defendant who wears prison attire is more
likely to be convicted); Shepard, supra note 82, at 2208.
102
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505.
103
Id. at 518 (finding that prison attire “surely tends to brand [the
defendant] in the eyes of the jurors with an unmistakable mark of guilt”).
104
State v. Ditullio, No. CRC06-05827CFAWS (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2009); see
also Schwartz, supra note 85.
105
Carlin DeGuerin Miller, John Allen Ditullio Guilty Verdict: Neo-Nazi
Convicted of Murder, Sentenced to Life in Prison, CBS NEWS (Dec. 17,
2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20026011504083.html.
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jurors to see.106 Alternatively, Alan Dershowitz, a criminal
defense attorney and Harvard Law School professor, suggested
that “the swastika and other tattoos [were] an extension of
Ditullio’s persona, and masking the marks could be construed as
107
misleading to a jury.” Nonetheless, the court agreed with
Ditullio’s defense attorney that unless Ditullio’s neo-Nazi tattoos
were covered, his physical appearance could prejudice the
jury.108 Ditullio’s tattoos may have suggested to the jury that he
had unfavorable characteristics—essentially, that embodied in
Ditullio’s persona was an outwardly racist and hateful being.109
In one of the most publicized capital murder trials in
history,110 Casey Anthony’s defense team strategically selected
preppy clothing to project a childish and innocent image.111
106

Schwartz, supra note 85 (reporting that Ditullio’s lawyer argued for
his client’s tattoos to be covered up because “[t]here’s no doubt in my mind
without the makeup being used, there’s no way a jury could look at John and
judge him fairly”). Ditullio’s second trial was widely discussed because of
the court’s decision to have the state pay for his neo-Nazi tattoos to be
covered at trial. Id.
107
Cindy E. Rodriguez, Neo-Nazi Accused of Hate-Crime Murder Gets
Make-over, ABC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/neo-naziaccused-hate-crime-murder-makeover/story?id=12324409#.UIXSiUKRrww.
108
Ditullio, No. CRC06-05827CFAWS; see also K. McKinney,
Brunvand Wins Motion to Have Murder Defendant’s Tattoos Covered During
Trial, ACQUITTER.COM (Dec. 7, 2009), http://acquitter.com/news/florida/
brunvand-wins-motion-cover-tattoos/.
109
Greg Wims, the President of the Victims’ Rights Foundation, stated,
“People should be able to see these tattoos. The jury should see what kind of
person he is. Of course those tattoos are central to the case.” Rodriguez,
supra note 107; see Ryan Lozar, Tattoos as Evidence, CALIFORNIA LAWYER
57–58 (2012) (explaining that snap judgments about a defendant’s character
that are based on physical appearance are especially severe when the
defendant has a tattoo, and noting that depending on the subject of the tattoo,
the defendant may be perceived as “seedy, provocative, or downright
dangerous”).
110
State v. Anthony, No. 48-2008-CF-015606-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011);
see also State of Florida v. Casey Marie Anthony, NINTH JUD. CIRCUIT CT.
FLA., http://www.ninthcircuit.org/news/High-Profile-Cases/Anthony/ (last
visited Mar. 16, 2013) (highlighting the court’s media policies).
111
See Bigbee, supra note 89 (describing a change in Casey Anthony’s
courtroom attire from “stylish in a sexually-suggestive way” to “a modest,
plaid shirt under a drab gray cardigan sweater”). Casey Anthony was accused
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Anthony’s appearance evolved throughout the trial: from
oversized112 and pastel-colored shirts113 to preppy sweaters and
long hair.114 Anthony’s defense team crafted a story about her
of murdering her two-year-old daughter, Caylee Anthony, but the jury
acquitted her of first-degree murder. Michael Winter, Casey Anthony
Acquitted
of
Murder,
USA
TODAY
(July
5,
2011),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/07/caseyanthony-jury-reaches-verdict/1. In the infamous case of the Menendez
brothers, the defendants used a similar preppy look. The brothers were
convicted of violently murdering their parents. Throughout their trial, the
brothers donned preppy sweaters. Although the jurors acknowledged that the
defendants’ appearance was not admissible evidence, they still “discussed the
fact that the defendants wore sweaters as opposed to suits to court.”
THORNTON, supra note 83, at 111; see also Dominick Dunne, The Menendez
Murder Trial, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 1993), http://www.vanityfair.com/
magazine/archive/1993/10/dunne199310 (reporting that the Menendez
brothers’ “Armani-type clothes [were] replaced in the courtroom by sensible
shirts, slacks, and sweaters, brought freshly washed and ironed each morning
for them to change into from the L.A. County Jail uniforms they [were]
wearing when they arrive[d] at court”).
112
Casey’s Appearance Could Be Changed to Influence Jury, (Apr. 7,
2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.wftv.com/news/news/caseys-appearance-couldbe-changed-to-influence-ju/nK99f/ (describing Anthony’s clothes as “baggy
and disheveled” and noting that she transformed her image to fit a “librarian
look” and donned clothing that matched her defense team’s attire); SMITH &
MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.19, at 36 (“To create a victimized look or a
look of helplessness, the individual should wear oversized clothing . . . . ”).
One explanation for matching attire might be the proximity between Anthony
and one of her female attorneys. If there is a stark difference in dress
between attorney and client, any images will be perceived as “more
extreme.” Id. at 35.
113
Compare Lillian Glass, Jose Baez and Casey Anthony’s Body
Language Show Delight in Jurors’ Negative Reactions Towards Nancy Grace,
Casey’s Courtroom Tension Builds on Day 6, DR. LILLIAN GLASS BODY
LANGUAGE BLOG, (May 15, 2011), http://drlillianglassbodylanguageblog.
wordpress.com/2011/05/15/jose-baez-and-casey-anthonys-body-language-show
-delight-in-jurors-negative-reactions-towards-nancy-grace-caseys-courtroomtension-builds-on-day-6/ (depicting Casey Anthony’s use of pastel-colored and
ruffled clothing at trial), with SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.19, at
36 (“To create a submissive look for a woman, pastels and ruffles should be
worn.”).
114
See Jessica Hopper & Ashleigh Banfield, Casey Anthony Trial:
Defense Team Claims Caylee Anthony Drowned in Family Pool, ABC NEWS,
(May 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey_anthony_trial/casey-
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character through her appearance that suggested that Anthony
was a child-like woman “forever stuck in adolescence.”115
Perhaps to the jurors, Anthony appeared as a woman incapable
of having committed the brutal crime of which she was accused.
The court did not consider Anthony’s appearance to be relevant
admissible evidence, yet legal analysts suggested that the defense
counsel attempted to “subtly influence the judge” by altering
Anthony’s appearance.116 It follows that what may subtly
influence the judge may also influence the jury.117 At the trial’s
conclusion, the jury acquitted Anthony of the capital murder
118
charge. As these cases highlight, the Supreme Court, defense
attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, and law professors all
recognize that a defendant’s appearance has the potential to
encourage certain biases in jurors.
III. THE NERD DEFENSE
Since eyeglasses can drastically change one’s appearance,
they are a particularly powerful tool with which to alter juror
perceptions.119 A defendant who wears eyeglasses to trial without
any need to correct vision impairment utilizes the nerd defense
anthony-trial-defense-claims-caylee-anthony-drowned/story?id=13674375; see
also SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.24, at 48 (noting that to help
portray a soft and submissive look in the courtroom, a client’s hair should be
longer).
115
Bigbee, supra note 89.
116
Casey’s Appearance Could Be Changed to Influence Jury, supra note
112.
117
Judges are more likely than jurors to notice defense teams’ strategies
because judges are trained to examine the law and are attuned to the
strategies that defense teams employ. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 126 (1988) (discussing the argument against jury trials by
acknowledging that judges and lawyers are “courtroom veterans” as
compared to the jury).
118
Winter, supra note 111.
119
See Tom Davies, Framed! Sharon Osbourne, OPTICIAN ONLINE (Nov.
18, 2005), http://www.opticianonline.net/Articles/2005/11/18/14675/Framed!
+Sharon+Osbourne.htm (stating that eyeglasses can cause the ugly to
“become cool” and the cool to “become intelligent”).
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in the hopes of appearing more intelligent120 and therefore less
121
likely to have committed a crime. Juries are less likely to
convict defendants whom they find more “likeable,”122 and
studies show that wearing eyeglasses helps to make a defendant
123
Wearing nonprescriptive eyeglasses
appear more likeable.
fabricates a defect in a defendant and plays upon one of
society’s most deeply rooted stereotypes: that glasses are
synonymous with higher intelligence.124 In this sense, wearing
nonprescriptive eyewear is analogous to using crutches or a
wheelchair despite lacking a physical injury.125 By contrast,
dressing a defendant in a suit and tie, adding accessories (e.g.,
watches and rings), altering hairstyle, or applying makeup can
affect juror perception, but such changes do not falsely represent
a handicap or a physical defect.126 Similarly, a defendant who
120

Alexander, supra note 9; see also Brown, supra note 9, at 1.
Brown, supra note 9, at 3; see also Rita Handrich, The Glasses
Create a Kind of Unspoken Nerd Defense, KEENE TRIAL CONSULTING (Mar.
7, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://keenetrial.com/blog/2011/03/07/the-glasses-createa-kind-of-unspoken-nerd-defense (“The idea that the Nerd Defense might
work (or help) is an extension of the fact that Nerds are evidently viewed as
being less likely to commit crimes . . . . If they create an image of someone
who ‘doesn’t look like they would do that sort of thing,’ it will aid in the
defense.”).
122
SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, supra note 85, at 442. However,
attractiveness is also a component of likability, and glasses are perceived as
making the wearer less attractive. Terry & Krantz, supra note 41, at 1766
(noting that the “negative” perceptions of those who wear eyeglasses lead to
“increas[ed] ratings of character, compassion, honesty, and sensitivity [and]
decreas[ed] ratings of attractiveness [and forcefulness]”); see generally Leder
et al., supra note 24 (connecting the wearing of eyeglasses with increased
intelligence and decreased attractiveness).
123
See, e.g., SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.21 at 42 (noting
that wide lenses help to create an open-eyed look that is associated with traits
of trustworthiness, likability, and innocence).
124
Thornton, The Effect of Wearing Glasses upon Judgments of
Personality Traits of Persons Seen Briefly, supra note 52, at 203; Brown,
supra note 9, at 3.
125
See Marshall, supra note 18 (“Glasses convey information about
physical capabilities the same way coming into court on crutches or in a
wheelchair does.”).
126
Id. (contrasting use of fake eyewear with “haircut, a shave, a suit and
121
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chooses to wear contacts rather than eyeglasses to trial has not
falsely represented a handicap. The real problem lies in
concocting a handicap that brings with it such powerful social
stereotypes. Richard Waites, the Chief Executive of a jury
consulting firm, observes that “[j]urors expect to see defendants
wearing [nice shirts and ties],” but “[j]urors don’t expect to see
defendants wearing glasses if they don’t have to.”127 Eyeglasses
128
are now one of the world’s most popular fashion accessories,
viewed as possessing the unique power to “transform you like
no other accessory.”129 Defense attorneys have taken note of this
pop-culture trend and are increasingly employing the nerd
defense as a courtroom tactic.130
A. Studies Concerning the Effect of Eyeglasses on Jurors’
Perceptions
In one analysis of a study conducted in 2008, psychologist
Michael J. Brown examined the social-cognitive processes
involved when individuals make decisions, attributions, and
judgments.131 In Brown’s study, 220 students were presented
with a portfolio containing the vignette of a fictitious trial
involving a violent crime, the defendant’s photograph and
physical description, and a survey asking the reader to render a
shined shoes,” which are not deceptive). Although eyeglasses are being
increasingly worn as fashion accessories, their original purpose was to correct
for an eye defect. Leder et al., supra note 24, at 211 (“The primary use of
eyeglasses is their ability to correct congenital or acquired vision deficits such
as myopia, presbyopia, or astigmatism.”).
127
Alexander, supra note 9.
128
Leder et al., supra note 24, at 211; Joel Stein, The TIME 100 Most
21,
2011),
Influential
Things
in
the
World,
TIME (Apr.
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2066367_206658
4_2066602-3,00.html (ranking “nerd glasses” as the 74th most influential
thing in the world).
129
Davies, supra note 119.
130
Tillman, supra note 5; Debra Cassens Weiss, Instruction on Slaying
Defendant’s New Eyeglasses at Issue on Appeal, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 14, 2012,
8:52 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/instruction_on_slaying_
defendants_new_eyeglasses_at_issue_on_appeal/.
131
Brown, supra note 9, at 1.
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verdict and to rate the defendant as either “more” or “less”
physically threatening, intelligent, attractive, and friendly.132 The
portfolio included the defendant’s photograph in one of four
possible combinations: male Caucasian wearing eyeglasses; male
Caucasian not wearing eyeglasses; African American wearing
eyeglasses; or African American not wearing eyeglasses.133 In
this study, participants rendered a “guilty” verdict only fortyfour percent of the time against defendants who wore eyeglasses,
while defendants who did not wear eyeglasses were found
“guilty” fifty-six percent of the time.134 The study found no
significant difference between the verdicts for Caucasian
defendants and the verdicts for African-American defendants.135
Brown’s follow-up study, using the same general format and
method noted above, examined the effect of eyeglasses in a
136
white-collar crime context. Consistent with the previous study,
defendants who wore eyeglasses were rated as being more
intelligent.137 However, increased ratings of intelligence
positively correlated with an increased number of guilty
verdicts. In Brown’s presentation of a white-collar crime,
eyeglasses had a “detrimental indirect effect” on a defendant by
138
making the defendant appear more intelligent. Brown’s studies
did not definitively conclude that wearing eyeglasses equates to
132

Id. at 3.
Id. (using models comparable in age, weight, hair color, hair length,
eye size, and facial hair, and wearing the same eyeglasses in each
photograph).
134
Id.
135
Id. (concluding that Caucasians received guilty verdicts fifty-one
percent of the time, while African Americans received guilty verdicts fortynine percent of the time). Although there was not a significant difference in
verdicts based on race, “race was a significant predictor of several perceived
defendant characteristics.” Id. When both race and eyeglasses were taken into
account, African Americans were perceived as more attractive and more
friendly, while Caucasians were perceived as less attractive and less friendly.
Moreover, African-American defendants wearing eyeglasses were perceived
as less physically threatening than Caucasian defendants wearing eyeglasses.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 3–4.
138
Id. at 3.
133
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either a “not guilty” verdict or a “guilty” verdict.139 Rather,
these studies found that wearing eyeglasses has a significant
indirect effect on verdict outcome.140 This is because wearing
eyeglasses relates to increased ratings of intelligence, and
perceived intelligence positively affects jurors’ verdicts in
violent-crime scenarios and negatively affects jurors’ verdicts in
white-collar-crime scenarios.141 While these studies merely
scratch the surface of the effect of eyeglasses on juror
perception, they lend support to the premise that jurors do not
relinquish their biases concerning eyewear in a courtroom
142
setting.
Research shows that jurors discriminate on the basis of
appearance,143 race,144 and gender.145 To compensate for juror
biases,146 defendants are urged to appear before the court well
147
Are unnecessary
groomed and in business-type attire.
eyeglasses simply another means to offset negative juror biases?
Wearing unnecessary eyeglasses, like wearing proper courtroom
139

Id. at 4.
Id.
141
Id. at 2–4.
142
Id. at 3–4, 6 (including a response from Tara Trask, a jury consultant
with 17 years of experience in litigation strategy, who stated, “I have seen
jurors tend to assign credibility to those who fit the stereotypes they have”).
143
Efran, supra note 74, at 45–54.
144
See Fein et al., supra note 82, at 491 (indicating that “research has
found that a jury’s racial composition . . . can have a significant effect on the
verdict that jury reaches”); see also Wiley, supra note 74, at 214 (noting that
“it is easier for jurors to imagine themselves in the defendant’s situation
when the defendant is of the same race as the juror”).
145
Ahola et al., supra note 70, at 321 (finding that “[i]n the courtroom
situation, the defendant will be judged more severely by a judge or jurors of
the same gender as the defendant him/herself; being sentenced by a judge of
the opposite sex will be to the advantage of the defendant”).
146
See THORNTON, supra note 83, at 103–08 (noting that the legal
system acknowledges that jurors “bring to any new experience all past
experiences and attitudes,” but that “it is not always possible to recognize
those biases and eliminate those jurors” through the jury selection process).
147
Mark J. Sullivan, A Defendant’s Guide to Courtroom Etiquette,
CRIME, JUST. & AM. 34, 35 (2001) (suggesting to criminal defendants that
jurors should, at first impression, be unable to discern through dress who is
the defendant and who is the attorney).
140
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attire, portrays favorable characteristics to the jury.148 However,
by analogy, a defendant who seeks to offset juror bias might
utilize a multitude of props (such as unnecessary crutches or
neck braces) that are designed to manipulate the jury and elicit
misplaced sympathy and favorable judgment. Wearing proper
courtroom attire does not fabricate a defect in any way.
However, wearing unnecessary eyeglasses to trial is akin to
telling the jury a lie without consequence. Such behavior
undermines a judicial system that is designed to arrive at the
truth.149
B. Reception of the Nerd Defense in Criminal Trials
Strong opinions abound about a defendant’s use of
unnecessary eyeglasses at trial.150 The use of nonprescriptive
eyewear by defendants is becoming increasingly popular, with
inmates strategically swapping eyeglasses before hearings,
friends and family delivering eyeglasses during visits to inmates,
and lawyers supplying clients with eyeglasses.151 The nerd
defense has received significant media attention, with
commentators both endorsing and criticizing the use of
148

See id. (noting that formal dress for defendants in the courtroom leads
jurors to believe that the defendant is serious and leads judges to believe that
defendants have respect for the courtroom); see also Brown, supra note 9, at
2–4.
149
See Anderson, supra note 78, at 1928 (stating that the jury has a
“solemn duty to find the truth”).
150
Kevin Deutsch, Defense Lawyers Swear by Gimmick of Having
Defendants Wearing Glasses at Trial, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2011),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-02-13/news/28613008_1 (“If a jury
thinks the defendant looks incapable of a brutal crime, then it’s certainly an
advantage for the defense . . . . The glasses create a kind of unspoken nerd
defense.”); Marshall, supra note 18 (“If glasses made a guy like Larry Davis
look gentle, they can work for anybody . . . . I always tell clients to get a
pair. The nerdier the better.”); Alexander, supra note 9 (noting that “[o]ften
times it’s about perception, and glasses help with that perception” and
“[eyeglasses are] masks . . . [t]hey’re designed to confuse the witness and
influence the jury”); Weiss, supra note 130 (quoting Harvey Slovis, who
stated that “I’ve tried cases where there’s been a tremendous amount of
evidence, but my client wore glasses, dressed well and got acquitted”).
151
Alexander, supra note 9.
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nonprescriptive eyewear by defendants in a courtroom setting.152
The following cases provide examples of the utilization of the
nerd defense in criminal trials.
In the infamous case of People v. Davis, a twenty-one-yearold defendant was charged with the attempted murder of nine
police officers as they sought to arrest him.153 During a lengthy
trial period, the prosecution used police testimony to portray
154
Larry Davis, the defendant, as a “gold chain-clad thug.” The
defense countered by altering Davis’ appearance, giving him a
clean-cut look and a pair of horn-rimmed eyeglasses155 to make
156
him “look like Mr. Peepers.” In a trial that spanned seven
months, Davis was acquitted of the attempted murder of the
officers.157
In 2011, a Bronx jury acquitted Thomas Cordero, known as
“[the] nude housekeeper,” on charges of stabbing John Conley
to death.158 On the advice of his lawyer, Harvey Slovis, Cordero
donned eyeglasses throughout the trial.159 Despite Cordero’s
152

See Marshall, supra note 18 (raising concerns about whether putting
nonprescriptive eyeglasses on a defendant with 20-20 eyesight rises to the
level of deceit prohibited by New York Legal Ethics Rule 8.4); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002); John Pertzborn, Chet
Pleban: Nerd Defense in the Courtroom, FOX2NOW ST. LOUIS (Apr. 2,
2012, 8:18 AM), http://fox2now.com/2012/04/02/chet-pleban-nerd-defensein-the-courtroom/.
153
People v. Davis, 537 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
154
Deutsch, supra note 150.
155
See id. (observing that at trial, Davis resembled a studious young
adult “dressed like a college student, sporting horn-rimmed glasses and
sweaters”).
156
Marshall, supra note 18.
157
See William G. Blair, Jury in Bronx Acquits Larry Davis in Shooting
TIMES
(Nov.
21,
1988),
of
Six
Police
Officers,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/21/nyregion/jury-in-bronx-acquits-larrydavis-in-shooting-of-six-police-officers.html.
158
Kevin Deutsch & Bill Hutchinson, “Nude Housekeeper” Acquitted of
Stabbing Client to Death Despite DNA Evidence, Confession, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS
(Jan.
13,
2011),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-0113/news/27087260_1_dna-evidence-confession-thomas-cordero.
159
Deutsch, supra note 150; see also Hannah Rand, The “Nerd
Defense”: How Violent Criminals Are Turning to Thick-Framed Hipster
Glasses to Persuade Juries They Are “More Intelligent, More Honest,” MAIL
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confession and the admission of DNA evidence linking him to
the murder, Cordero was acquitted.160 Cordero “ditched [the
eyeglasses] the moment he was free.”161
In perhaps the most publicized use of the nerd defense thus
far, five young men went on trial in Washington, D.C. in 2010
for first degree murder committed during “one of the District’s
deadliest outbreaks of violence.”162 Each of the defendants
arrived to court wearing large-framed and heavy-rimmed
glasses.163 This sparked the attention of the prosecution,
prompting Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Brittin to ask his
key witness if he had ever seen any of the men wearing
eyeglasses prior to trial.164 In the dozens of hearings before the

ONLINE (Mar. 30, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2122990/The-nerd-defense-How-violent-criminals-turning-framed-hipsterglasses-persuade-juries-intelligent-honest.html (reporting that defense attorney
Harvey Slovis gives “all his defendants thick-rimmed, nonprescription glasses
before court appearances to make them look less threatening”).
160
Minara El-Rahman, Nude Housekeeper Not Guilty of Murder,
FINDLAW (Jan. 21, 2011, 6:15 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/
2011/01/nude-housekeeper-not-guilty-of-murder.html (reporting that in a
taped statement, Cordero confessed to police that John Conley attempted to
rape him, at which time he took a knife from Conley and stabbed him, but
that at trial Cordero stated that he wanted to recant his confession because
“he was coerced by Detective Steven Berger”).
161
Deutsch, supra note 150.
162
Keith L. Alexander, Deliberations Begin in Five-Man District Murder
Trial, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/deliberations-in-five-man-district-murdertrial/2012/04/25/gIQAT15RhT_blog.html; see also South Capitol Street
Murders: Sanquan Carter, Orlando Carter, Jeffrey Best, Robert Bost and
Lamar Williams to be Sentenced, ABC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012 5:47 AM),
http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/09/south-capitol-street-murders-sanquancarter-orlando-carter-jeffrey-best-robert-bost-and-lamar-willia.html.
163
Alexander, supra note 9.
164
The defendants’ identities were at issue in the case, allowing the
prosecution to question two witnesses. Key witness Nathaniel Simms, who
had previously pled guilty in the case, responded with an unequivocal “no” to
U.S. Attorney Michael Brittin’s question concerning Orlando Carter’s use of
eyewear prior to trial. The answer was the “same for each of Carter’s codefendants.” Id.; see also District of Columbia v. Carter, No. 2010 CF1
005677 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
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trial, only one defendant had donned eyeglasses.165 Prosecutors
took advantage of the opportunity to suggest to jurors that the
defendants were being “dishonest in misrepresenting their
appearance.”166 All five defendants were found guilty.167 After
the trial, one prosecutor suggested that the defendants were
putting on a “schoolboy act.”168 Patricia Jefferies, grandmother
of one of the victims, agreed, arguing that the defendants’
strategy was aimed at “influencing the jury, trying to make them
think they’re Boy Scouts or something.”169 Together, these cases
demonstrate the ease with which a defendant can add eyeglasses
to his or her look to influence the jury.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF THE NERD DEFENSE AND THE
CHANGE-OF-APPEARANCE INSTRUCTION
A. Harris v. United States
The case of Harris v. United States marks the first instance
in which a defendant’s use of nonprescriptive eyewear at trial
became an explicit issue on appeal.170 In July 2008, a jury for
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Donnell
165

See Benjamin R. Freed, Murder Defendants Try Wearing Hipster
Glasses in Fashionable Attempt to Win Over Juries, DCIST (Mar. 27, 2012,
4:15 PM), http://dcist.com/2012/03/defense_attorneys_try_giving_client.php
(noting that Lamar Williams was the only defendant known to have ever
worn eyeglasses before trial).
166
Id.
167
Five Men Convicted of Charges for Their Roles in Crimes That Led to
Five Murders, Nine Other Shootings, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 7, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/news/2012/may/12-161.html (reporting that
all five men were convicted of murder, conspiracy, and other charges related
to violent crimes that culminated in the March 30, 2010 fatal shootings on
South Capitol Street); see also Carter, No. 2010 CF1 005677; District of
Columbia v. Carter, No. 2010 CF1 005176 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012); District
of Columbia v. Best, No. 2010 CF1 007370 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012); District
of Columbia v. Bost, No. 2010 CF1 007155 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012); District
of Columbia v. Williams, No. 2010 CF1 007157 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2012).
168
Alexander, supra note 9.
169
Freed, supra note 165.
170
Harris v. United States, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Harris guilty of second degree murder for the fatal shooting of
Michael Richardson.171 Soon after sentencing, Harris filed a
notice of appeal with the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.172 Harris’ use of eyewear, a “seemingly innocuous
detail” during the trial, was a “key issue at the heart of [his]
appeal.”173 On appeal, Chief Judge Eric Washington found
Harris’ use of eyeglasses to be one of the case’s most
174
Throughout trial, Harris consistently
compelling issues.
donned eyeglasses despite not having worn eyeglasses prior to
trial.175 This prompted the prosecution to request a change-of176
appearance instruction, a request that the judge granted.
When a court issues a change-of-appearance instruction, the
language used by the court can be damning to the defendant if
the jury determines that the defendant has, in fact, changed his
or her appearance.177 This is due to the inference of a
171

The government presented evidence that Harris entered Joe’s Steak
and Egg Restaurant at approximately 2:00 AM on June 29, 2007. Harris
asked to use the phone, and, when his request was denied, he left the
restaurant. Harris subsequently reentered the restaurant, where witnesses saw
him arguing with Richardson, an intern with the D.C. Public Defender
Service. Some time later, multiple gunshots were fired, fatally wounding
Richardson. Id.
172
See
Court
Cases
Online
Database,
D.C.
CTS.,
https://www.dccourts.gov/cco/maincase.jsf (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (search
for “Harris, Donnell”) (reporting that Harris first filed a notice of appeal on
Oct. 21, 2008).
173
Tillman, supra note 5. On appeal, Harris also argued that the trial
court erred by (1) overruling the defendant’s objections to statements made
during the prosecution’s closing argument, (2) excluding from jury
instructions the defendant’s theory that someone else committed the murder,
and (3) denying a motion for acquittal despite there being insufficient
evidence against the defendant. See Brief of Appellant, Harris, No. 08-CF1405.
174
Tillman, supra note 5.
175
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5.
176
Id. at 6.
177
Change-of-appearance instructions “contemplate[] some independent
evidence” that the defendant is the one who actually changed his or her
appearance. United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1991).
For example, this occurs where a defendant, shortly after committing a
crime, cuts or colors his or her hair or shaves his beard. Id.
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defendant’s consciousness of guilt, which “flows from any
change of appearance” instruction that is given to the jury.178
Change-of-appearance instructions generally contain language
that attributes to the defendant “consciousness of guilt” or “fear
of being identified.”179 In Harris, the change-of-appearance
instruction, issued as a result of the defendant’s sudden use of
eyeglasses, raised questions as to whether the defendant’s rights
had been prejudiced.180 Defense counsel asserted that the changeof-appearance instruction is reserved for situations that “refer[]

178

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (“A defendant’s attempt to change his appearance after a crime has
been committed does not create a presumption of guilt. An innocent person
charged with a serious offense may resort to various means, both lawful and
unlawful, to avoid prosecution. On the other hand, you may consider
evidence of the defendant’s attempt to change his appearance as tending to
prove the defendant’s fear of being identified and therefore his consciousness
of guilt. You are not required to do so.” (emphasis added)); see also Perkins,
937 F.2d at 1402 n.3 (discussing a defendant’s appeal of a conviction for
bank robbery because the district court instructed the jury that “[a]
defendant’s intentional change of his appearance immediately after the
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not, of course, sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but may
be considered by the jury in the light of all other evidence in the case in
determining guilt or innocence,” and noting that “[w]hether or not evidence
of a change of appearance shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance
to be attached to any evidence, are matters exclusively within the province of
the jury” (emphasis added) (citing Devitt & Blackmar, FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 15.08)).
180
Trial Transcript at 87–88, United States v. Harris, No. CF1-18801-07
(D.C. Super. Ct. 2008), reprinted in Appellant’s Limited Appendix, Harris,
No. 08-CF-1405 (“You heard evidence that Donnell Harris attempted to
change his appearance to avoid being identified. It is up to you to decide that
he took these actions. If you find he did so, you may consider this evidence
as tending to show his feelings of guilt which you may in turn consider as
tending to show actual guilt. On the other hand, you may also consider that
he may have taken these actions for reasons fully consistent with innocence in
this case.” (emphasis added)); see also BARBARA BERGMAN, CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.303(B) (5th ed. 2008).
The defense argued that the trial court issued this instruction in error because
the government did not establish that Harris was “attempting to conceal his
identity by wearing glasses.” Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 6.
179
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to [a defendant] doing things like shaving his head, as opposed
to having dreadlocks . . . [and] shaving his beard, as opposed to
having facial hair.”181 The defense further argued that Harris
needed the eyeglasses in order to “read through voluminous
material,” although there was no such evidence presented at trial
to back this assertion.182 The prosecution rebutted the defense’s
stance by calling two key witnesses to testify that they had never
183
At trial, the
previously seen Harris wearing eyeglasses.
government argued that Harris’ eyewear was “an attempt at
concealment” because “eyeglasses do change appearance
. . . .”184 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court
that the “wearing of glasses at trial had some probative value[]
and that the prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative
value.”185 The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, in
part, because the appeals court determined that Harris’ rights
had not been prejudiced by the change-of-appearance
instruction.186
181

Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–5.
Id. at 5. The trial court informed the jury that “there is no evidence in
the record that Mr. Harris needs glasses to read or anything else,” finding
Harris’ explanation for his use of eyeglasses to be mere “speculation.” Id.;
see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 6, at 30 n.32.
183
See Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 6 (noting that the defense
argued that eyeglasses could not conceal the identity of the defendant to
someone who knew him well and pointing out that one witness knew Harris
his entire life and another witness encountered Harris on a regular basis as a
routine customer); see also Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–5 (observing that
Francis Iwuh knew Harris since infancy and Marion Sesay knew Harris as a
regular customer at the Steak and Egg Restaurant where the shooting took
place).
184
Brief of Appellant, supra note 173, at 5; Leder et al., supra note 24,
at 212; Tillman, supra note 5 (quoting U.S. Attorney John Gidez, who
argued “that even if [wearing eyeglasses] was not a profound change, it could
still alter Harris’ appearance enough to potentially cause a non-identification
or misidentification by witnesses who didn’t know Harris well enough to
recognize him with or without glasses”).
185
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5. The trial court’s reasoning aligns with
the proposition that a defendant’s appearance may become relevant evidence
if it “forms the basis of identification” in the case. Levenson, supra note 79,
at 577 n.19.
186
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 6 (affirming the lower court ruling and
182
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The D.C. Court of Appeals premised its justification for
upholding the lower court’s change-of-appearance instruction on
two factors: (1) a defendant’s identification must be at issue and
(2) a defendant must have “significant[ly]” changed his or her
appearance before trial.187 The fundamental problem with this
opinion is that it does not define the scope of “identification”
matters for purposes of issuing a change-of-appearance
instruction.188 Does the defendant’s identification need to be
specifically at issue, as it was in Harris, for the court to
properly issue a change-of-appearance instruction? Or can the
holding in Harris be interpreted to encompass all situations in
which a witness is asked to identify the defendant simply as a
procedural requirement—even when no genuine issue of
identification is present?189 Harris leaves unanswered two critical
holding that even if the change-of-appearance instruction was in error, it was
harmless under Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946));
Zoe Tillman, Appeals Court Rules Glasses Instruction Not Prejudicial in
Murder Trial, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 24, 2012, 1:33 PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2012/10/appeals-court-rules-glassesinstruction-not-prejudicial-in-murder-trial.html.
187
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5–6 (focusing on identification by
relying heavily on United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir.
2004), which reasoned that a defendant’s change in appearance should have
been coupled with “anticipa[tion] that witnesses would be called at trial to
identify him”).
188
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5 (noting that the trial court recognized
that a change in the defendant’s appearance must be significant to warrant a
change-of-appearance instruction). The trial court touched on the scope of the
change-of-appearance instruction when the trial judge stated, “I’m not sure if
[wearing glasses] is [an] attempt to change his appearance so he couldn’t be
identified. It’s not like he changed his appearance before a lineup or before
some photographic identification. He’s wearing glasses now.” Brief of
Appellant, supra note 173, at 5. Still, the trial court issued the instruction
and the appeals court affirmed the instruction without any further
clarification. Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 6.
189
When the defense stipulates to a defendant’s identification, there is no
genuine issue as to identification. Compare United States v. Alexander, 48
F.3d 1477, 1490 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Identification of the defendant as the
person who committed the charged crime is always an essential element
which the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt.”), with
United States v. Darrell, 629 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] witness
need not physically point out a defendant so long as the evidence is sufficient
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questions: (1) Can the change-of-appearance instruction be given
in a case in which a defendant’s identification is not specifically
at issue but the defendant wears nonprescriptive eyeglasses to
trial? and (2) How should a judge instruct the jury concerning a
defendant’s “significant” change of appearance when the
defendant’s identity is not specifically at issue?190 This type of
defendant is not attempting to avoid identification;191 rather, he
or she is attempting to misguide the jury with persistent and
subtle changes in appearance that are intimately linked with
society’s most deeply rooted stereotypes.192 To avoid such
misguidance, a jury should be instructed in a manner that
balances a defendant’s right of expression against the jury’s right
to the truth.
B. Carefully Balancing a Defendant’s Constitutional Rights
Against Potential Jury Manipulation
A defendant’s right to a fair trial is one of his or her
fundamental liberties, a right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.193 Due Process Clause
principles firmly hold that the State cannot force a defendant to
appear before a jury in a manner that suggests that the defendant
to permit the inference that the person on trial was the person who committed
the crime.”).
190
This question is unanswered by the court in Harris. Harris is the first
case focusing solely on a defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses to signal
a “significant” change in appearance and thus justifying the resulting jury
instruction. Compare Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5, with Carr, 373 F.3d at
1353 (looking at a combination of the defendant’s beard, weight, and glasses
to signal “profound alterations” in appearance and justifying the resulting
jury instruction).
191
A defendant who stipulates to identification is not attempting to avoid
being identified. Attempting to avoid identification through a significant
change in appearance would warrant the issuing of a change-of-appearance
instruction to the jury. See Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 4–5.
192
See Hellström & Tekle, supra note 20, at 695 (articulating that
judgments about intelligence and successfulness can be traced back to the
development of myopia caused by extensive schoolwork in childhood days).
193
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976).
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is guilty.194 During trial, a defendant is “on display for the
195
jury.” Consequently, members of the jury might notice and
take into account details of the defendant’s appearance that
nonjurors might find irrelevant.196 But how far may a defendant
go to change his or her appearance in order to convey
innocence? Courts have held that a defendant may wear to trial
such clothing items as religious cult wear,197 sweatshirts with
198
and official military academy dress
religious symbols,
uniforms.199 A defendant has a First Amendment right to control
his or her appearance at trial.200 Generally, this right is subject to
201
the judge’s discretion. However, when a defendant’s dress in
the courtroom involves religious attire, the standard for
194

Shepard, supra note 82, at 2208.
Levenson, supra note 79, at 575.
196
THORNTON, supra note 83, at 112; see also Levenson, supra note 79,
at 574 (noting that “the outcome of the case is affected by many factors that
are technically not evidence: the quality of the lawyers’ presentations, the
appearance and reaction of the defendant in the courtroom, and even the
presence of the victim’s representatives”).
197
See United States v. Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (holding that defendants may choose to wear to trial religious cult
uniforms, including white robes and white turbans).
198
Joseph v. State, 642 So. 2d 613, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that defendants may wear to trial shirts with religious symbols).
199
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 819, 820–21 (Va. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that defendants may wear to trial official military uniforms).
200
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1115 (R.I.
1978) (recognizing the mandate in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
to strike a balance between a defendant’s First Amendment right and the
“interest of the court in maintaining decorum in its proceedings by regulating
dress in the courtroom”); see also Yahweh, 779 F. Supp. at 1345 (stating that
defendants may choose to wear “suitable clothing of their choice in the
courtroom”).
201
Johnson, 449 S.E.2d at 820–21 (“The conduct of a trial includes
courtroom decorum. The trial court has the duty and the authority, in the
exercise of sound discretion, to require persons attending court to dress in a
manner appropriate to their functions and consistent with the publicity and
dignity of the courtroom.”); see also Catherine Theresa Clarke, Missed
Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1001 (1991) (noting
the concern that some clothing can distract or offend judges as “a breach of
etiquette because it undermines the serious, professional atmosphere of the
proceedings”).
195
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regulating such dress is higher: the government must
demonstrate a compelling interest.202
By wearing nonprescripive eyeglasses to trial, a defendant
attempts to cultivate an image premised on potentially
misleading character traits that are associated with wearing
eyeglasses.203 A defendant’s use of nonprescriptive eyeglasses
therefore presents a unique challenge to the criminal court
system: it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to prohibit a
defendant’s free expression through the use of nonprescriptive
eyeglasses at trial, but it is also inconsistent with the truthseeking principles of the judicial system to allow a defendant to
purposefully mislead a jury. This Note proposes a modified
change-of-appearance instruction that mitigates potential jury
manipulation and that does not carry with it the same
presumption of guilt as a standard change-of-appearance
instruction concerning specific identification matters.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Harris confirms that the prosecution may inquire into a
defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses and request a change202

See In re Palmer, 386 A.2d at 1115 (noting the need in the courtroom
to “accommodate the right to exercise the religious freedoms safeguarded by
the first amendment with the right of the state to regulate these individual
freedoms for the sake of societal interests”); see also McMillan v. State, 265
A.2d 453, 456 (Ct. App. Md. 1970) (stating that “[w]e are fully aware that
the orderly administration of courts of justice requires the maintenance of
dignity and decorum and for that reason rules of conduct and behavior to
govern participants are essential . . . . Understandably, respect for the courts
is something in which the State has a compelling interest”).
203
See Brown, supra note 9, at 2–6 (finding that defendants who wear
eyeglasses appear more intelligent and less physically threatening); Terry &
Krantz, supra note 41, at 1766 (finding that wearing eyeglasses increases
ratings for character, compassion, honesty, and sensitivity—but that
eyeglasses decrease ratings of attractiveness and forcefulness); Harris, supra
note 56, at 1674 (finding that those who wear eyeglasses appear more timid
and more intelligent than those who do not wear eyeglasses); Aylin Zafar,
“Hipster” Glasses Might Get You Off the Hook in Court, TIME (Mar. 30,
2012),
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/30/hipster-glasses-might-get-youoff-the-hook-in-court/ (noting that eyeglasses help make an individual appear
“a little emasculated”).
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of-appearance instruction when the defendant’s identification is
specifically at issue.204 Presumably, this is because eyeglasses
tend to cover a significant portion of the eye region and can
restructure the appearance of facial features,205 making it difficult
206
to recognize a defendant who wears eyeglasses. In Harris, the
appeals court agreed with the lower court that the “wearing of
glasses at trial [has] some probative value” which is not
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.207 However, when a
defendant’s identification is not specifically at issue, the
prosecution cannot request a change-of-appearance instruction
because such an instruction is designed to address changes in
appearance related to potential misidentification.208 This Note
proposes two possible solutions to this problem.
A. Modifying the Change-of-Appearance Instruction When
the Defendant’s Identification Is Not Specifically at
Issue
A defendant’s use of nonprescriptive eyewear at trial
generally constitutes a specific attempt to intentionally misguide
the jury, and it works against the fundamental principles of a
judicial system that seeks the truth in all cases. Jury awareness
of this tactic will help to lessen the impact of intentional jury
manipulation. As currently utilized by courts, the change-ofappearance instruction is particularly harsh because it can imply
a consciousness of guilt.209 Although change-of-appearance
204

Harris v. United States, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 2, § 1.21, at 42.
206
See Leder et al., supra note 24, at 216–18 (finding that “glasses
impede the immediate recognition of faces” because it takes longer to
recognize faces with full-rim glasses than it does to recognize faces either
without glasses or with rimless glasses).
207
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5.
208
United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also MULDOON, supra note 16, § 9:262 (“The prosecutor may properly
comment on the defendant’s changed appearance at trial, as compared to the
time of the crime, where identification is a trial issue.”).
209
Inferences drawn about a defendant’s “consciousness of guilt”
reasonably “flow[] from any change of appearance” instruction that is given
to the jury. Perkins, 937 F.2d at 1403; People v. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d
205
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instructions typically specify that the charge does not carry a
presumption of guilt, jurors might be unable to ignore the harsh
language of the instruction or jurors might give the inference too
much weight.210 For these reasons, the standard change-ofappearance instruction should be reserved for situations in which
a defendant has significantly changed his or her appearance and
where his or her identification is specifically at issue in the case.
A defendant who seeks to encourage misidentification
through the use of unnecessary eyewear should be distinguished
from a defendant who requires a prescription for eyeglasses.211
When a defendant dons unnecessary eyeglasses for purposes of
persuasion212—but not for purposes of misidentification—the jury
should be made aware through a modified change-of-appearance
instruction.
This Note’s proposed modification of the change-ofappearance instruction removes the language connecting a
defendant’s change of appearance to his or her consciousness of
guilt in order to account for a defendant’s right of free
expression. The modification expands the scope of a standard
change-of-appearance instruction to cover a defendant’s use of
eyeglasses as a means to unofficially introduce persuasive and
886, 890, 893 (1968) (noting that the defendant’s significant change in
appearance correlated to consciousness of guilt because “consciousness of
guilt can reasonably be inferred from [defendant’s] action in shaving off his
beard shortly after the [crime]”); see also Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5
(quoting Lazo v. United States, 930 A.2d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2007))
(“‘When supported by the evidence, we have recognized the legitimacy of’
the change of appearance argument based on the attempted change of
appearance jury instruction.”).
210
See generally Levenson, supra note 79, at 581 (“Juries are not
machines and courtrooms are not laboratories. Laboratories are controlled
environments in which trial and error are accepted protocol. Even with rules
of evidence, trials do not assume the same type of controlled, sterile
environment.”).
211
A defendant who “significantly changes” his or her appearance before
trial in a case where his or her identity is specifically at issue has, by default,
changed appearance to avoid identification. Attempting to avoid identification
would warrant the issuing of a standard change-of-appearance instruction.
Harris, No. 08-CF-1405, at 5–6.
212
For example, a defendant with no history of wearing eyeglasses who
then wears eyeglasses to trial and whose identity is not specifically at issue.
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misleading character evidence and further instructs the jury on
how to properly consider such a tactic. This change-ofappearance instruction should be given when: (1) a defendant
dons unnecessary eyeglasses to trial and (2) identification of the
defendant is not specifically at issue. The proposed modification,
adapted from the instructions given in Carr213 and Harris,214
reads as follows:
During trial, the defendant changed his or her appearance
by wearing eyeglasses that he or she does not need. This
particular alteration in appearance after the commission
of a crime and in preparation for trial does not create a
presumption of guilt. It is entirely possible that an
innocent person would resort to both lawful and unlawful
means to avoid prosecution. The wearing of unnecessary
eyeglasses at trial is lawful.
In this case, the defendant’s wearing of eyeglasses
constituted a falsification of a vision deficiency. You may
consider this falsification an attempt by the defendant to
gain favorable judgment based upon the positive social
stereotypes associated with the wearing of eyeglasses,
which can include truthfulness, intelligence, and
nonaggressive demeanor.
When you consider the evidence presented in this case,
you may take into account the defendant’s choice to
appear at trial wearing eyeglasses that he or she does not
need. You are not required to do so.
A defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses at trial silently and
unofficially introduces character evidence.215 Consequently, when
213

See United States v. Carr, 373 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
See Trial Transcript at 87–88, United States v. Harris, No. CF118801-07 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2008), reprinted in Appellant’s Limited
Appendix, Harris, No. 08-CF-1405.
215
See Brown, supra note 9, at 3 (using a case with “purposefully
ambiguous evidence” to examine the effect of eyeglasses on juror perceptions
of defendants and finding both a direct link between eyeglasses and
perception of increased intelligence and a correlation between increased
intelligence and fewer guilty verdicts). Everything about a defendant’s
appearance has an “impact in the courtroom.” SMITH & MALANDRO, supra
note 2, § 1.26, at 54.
214
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a defendant’s identity is only at issue as a procedural
requirement,216 the prosecution is limited to informing the jury of
the defendant’s use of unnecessary eyewear through relevant
admitted evidence, such as photographs,217 answers to juror
218
219
inquiries, or evidence first introduced by the defendant.
However, these methods are insufficient because they are
unpredictable and leave jurors to consider evidence concerning
the defendant’s use of unnecessary eyeglasses but without proper
instruction as to how to consider such conduct.220
Any inquiry into a defendant’s unnecessary use of eyeglasses
at trial will likely be aimed at attacking a defendant’s
truthfulness.221 However, even if a defendant first introduces
evidence of his or her truthfulness by taking the stand,222 Federal
216

For example, if the defense stipulates to the defendant’s identity
before trial.
217
If a photograph presented as evidence at trial depicts a defendant
without eyeglasses and the defendant subsequently wears eyeglasses at trial,
the jury may acknowledge the defendant’s change in appearance.
218
Certain states allow jurors to pose questions to defendants during trial.
During Jodi Arias’ capital murder trial, the jury posed two specific questions
concerning her eyeglasses: “What is your eye prescription?” and “If you are
so nearsighted then how could you drive?” Graham Winch, Arias Grilled
With Questions By Jurors, HLN LIVE BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/03/06/live-blog-what-will-jurors-ask-jodiarias.
219
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A).
220
See generally 3 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES
ON EVIDENCE § 16:26 (7th ed. 1997) (stating that twelve federal circuits
express a strong preference that when a jury is instructed on the issue of a
defendant's character, "the judge instruct the jury to consider evidence
relating to defendant's character together with the rest of the evidence in the
case").
221
“Character” embraces the quality of truthfulness, and although
“character” does not include having either “good eyesight or impaired
vision,” a defendant’s eyesight becomes linked to his or her truthfulness
when determining whether the defendant truly requires eyeglasses. MUELLER
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, § 4:23.
222
2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, § 4:43 (stating that
"[w]hen defendants [who take the stand] describe good behavior, patterns, an
honest, hardworking, nonviolent, or caring disposition, they open to
prosecutors the right to cross-examine on specific acts relevant to that
testimony").

THE NERD DEFENSE

769

Rule of Evidence 608(b) precludes the prosecution’s use of
extrinsic evidence for the sole purpose of attacking the
defendant’s truthfulness.223 Subject to the court’s discretion, on
cross-examination a prosecutor may inquire into the defendant’s
use of unnecessary eyeglasses if the court deems such
information to be “probative of the [defendant’s] character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness.”224 Nonetheless, this evidence may
still be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 due to its
potential for prejudice.225 Therefore, the modified change-ofappearance instruction is necessary to adequately inform jurors
of the defendant’s purposeful attempt to misguide the jury and to
ensure that jurors are properly instructed as to how to consider
the defendant’s actions. This Note’s proposed instruction
functions as a safeguard against potential jury manipulation
because it provides the prosecution with a means of countering a
defendant’s strategic use of eyeglasses as a prop to elicit juror
biases. It ensures that jurors are made aware of and know how
to consider such information, while at the same time it informs
jurors that the nerd defense does not correlate to a defendant’s
consciousness of guilt.
B. Making an Eyeglasses Inquiry the “Norm” at Trial
Prosecution teams and law students should be exposed to the
tactics employed by defense teams. It is important for current
and future prosecutors to learn how and under what
circumstances to request a change-of-appearance instruction and
to learn how to ask questions about a defendant’s misleading
utilization of eyeglasses. This will ensure that a jury is better
223

See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s notes (stating that Rule
608(b) “has been amended to clarify that the absolute prohibition on extrinsic
evidence applies only when the sole reason for proffering that evidence is to
attack or support the witness’ character for truthfulness”); see also United
States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the principles
“embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 608 . . . limit the use of evidence
designed to show that the witness has done things, unrelated to the suit being
tried, that make him more or less believable per se”).
224
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
225
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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equipped to properly consider a defendant’s strategic change of
appearance.
If the prosecution is suspicious of a defendant’s sudden use
of eyeglasses at trial, the prosecution should be allowed to
inquire, in the absence of the jury, into the defendant’s need for
eyeglasses. If the defendant is unable or unwilling to offer proof
of his or her need for eyeglasses—for example, through a
prescription, evidence of prior use of eyeglasses, or an eye
exam—then the court should grant the prosecution’s request for
a modified change-of-appearance jury instruction. One likely
objection to this rule is that indigent defendants might be unable
to pay for an eye exam that is necessary to prove their need for
eyeglasses. As such, any rule requiring defendants to offer proof
of their need for eyeglasses needs to be accompanied by a rule
requiring the state to pay for any necessary eye exams. Another
objection to this rule might be that defendants should not be
required to assist in their own prosecution. However, wearing
unnecessary eyeglasses is a defendant’s choice and such a
strategic accessory serves to mislead the jury. Making an
eyeglasses inquiry the norm might lead defense attorneys and
defendants to think twice before employing the nerd defense—
and therefore lessen the ability of defendants to hinder the truthseeking process by purposefully eliciting deep-seated biases in
jurors.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to an
226
is
impartial jury, afforded by the Sixth Amendment,
227
fundamental to a fair trial. The right to an impartial jury
228
includes the right to exclude potentially biased jurors. While
226

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury”).
227
See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (stating that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury trial).
228
See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (holding that “by
refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice, the trial judge
failed to adequately protect petitioner’s constitutional right to an impartial
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the trial process offers a system to exclude jurors with potential
biases, “jurors may not be willing to reveal their biases, or they
simply may not recognize they have any biases.”229 To
counteract unconscious biases held by jurors,230 the Court has
held that empaneling jurors from “a cross-section of the
community” is a necessary ingredient of the selection of an
impartial jury.231 However, when a bias is widely held,232
selection of a jury in this manner is insufficient by itself to
counteract such a bias.233 Research shows that stereotypes about
those who wear eyeglasses are so powerful as to cross
234
gendered,235 and racial divides.236 The biases
cultural,
jury”); Wiley, supra note 74, at 227.
229
THORNTON, supra note 83, at 108 (noting that “it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to empanel a jury of twelve ‘blank slates’ capable of hearing
evidence free of influence of past experiences”); see also SUTHERLAND &
CRESSEY, supra note 85, at 442 (noting that in certain cases, “several
thousand prospective jurors have been examined before twelve were secured”
and “[i]n one Chicago trial 9,425 persons were summoned for jury duty and
4,821 were examined before twelve were finally selected”).
230
See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and
Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REV. 107, 122 (1994) (noting that the fair-crosssection doctrine is designed to address juror biases resulting from “deepseated hunches and judgments about social life”).
231
See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (holding that “[w]e accept the fair-crosssection requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation”).
For a discussion of the jury-selection process in the context of gender
discrimination, see Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192 (1946). For a
discussion of the jury-selection process in the context of racial discrimination,
see Smith v. State of Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
232
Wiley, supra note 74, at 230 (arguing that discrimination based on
physical appearance may be even more “menacing” in American culture than
racial or gender discrimination because everyone discriminates based on
appearance).
233
See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (1978) (“The only
practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the
representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective
biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to
cancel each other out.”).
234
See Manz & Lueck, supra note 21, at 704.
235
See Harris, supra note 56, at 1674–75.
236
See Brown, supra note 9, at 3.
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associated with those who wear eyeglasses are deeply ingrained
in our minds in early stages of life.237
The United States judicial system is designed to eliminate
juror biases. Purposefully eliciting any biases from the jury
undermines the goal of the judicial system, which is to seek the
truth in all cases.238 While defendants have the right to control
their appearance at trial, there exists a distinction between a
defendant who simply presents himself or herself in “neat and
clean attire” and with “good grooming” and a defendant who
uses attire to present “an unrealistic suggestion of character.”239
A defendant who wears unnecessary eyeglasses fabricates a
vision handicap that is intimately tied to stereotypes of favorable
characteristics and manipulates the jury into believing a lie: that
the defendant truly requires eyeglasses. By providing a jury with
a modified change-of-appearance instruction, a court will enable
the jury to have a more complete and truthful base of knowledge
when considering the facts of the case and the jury will be better
equipped to consider the defendant’s change in appearance.

237

Walline et al., supra note 44, at 223 (describing a study finding that
children as young as six years old correlate wearing eyeglasses with character
traits of intelligence and honesty).
238
Strier, supra note 22, at 99.
239
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 819, 821 (Va. Ct. App.
1994).

